University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 16
Number 3 Spring, 1986

Article 2

1986

Idea Protection and the Copyright Clause: The
Problems of Preemption
Laura Anne Moeller

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Moeller, Laura Anne (1986) "Idea Protection and the Copyright Clause: The Problems of Preemption," University of Baltimore Law
Forum: Vol. 16 : No. 3 , Article 2.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol16/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Idea Protection and
the Copyright Clause:
The Problems of
Preemption
by Laura Anne Moeller

opyright does not protect ideas,
but only the expression of ideas. I
This distinction, long recognized
in copyright law as the idea-expression
dichotomy, was given express statutory
recognition in the 1976 Copyright Act. 2
Section 102(b) provides: "In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such a work." 3
While ideas have never received federal
copyright protection, state law doctrines
have traditionally provided protection for
such creative investments, subject to supremacy clause and first amendment limitations.
Copyright preemption issues invariably
arose as state law became a source of protection for intellectual property. In Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. StlfJe! Co. 4 and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court adopted a sweeping standard
offederal preemption, suggesting that state
protection of intellectual property would
be preempted whenever it conflicted, even
indirectly, with the objectives of the federal copyright and patent laws. However,
in Goldstein v. Calzfornia 6 and Kewanee
Co. v. Bicron Oil Corp., 7 the Supreme
Court curbed the preemptive sweep of the
Sears-Compco doctrine and allowed for
state protection in all areas which Congress
had left "unattended."s
Section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act 9 was intended to provide a statutory resolution of the copyright preemption
issues. The section effectively abolished
common law copyright and established
that state laws regulating copyright generally would be preempted. 10 The avowed
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purpose was to provide "a single Federal
system" of statutory copyright that "would
greatly improve the operation of the copyright law and would be much more effective in carrying out the basic constitutional
aims of uniformity and the promotion of
writing and scholarship." II Section 301
attempts to state this principle "in the
clearest and most unequivocal language
possible, so as to foreclose any conceivable
misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that Congress shall act preemptively,
and to avoid the development of any vague
borderline areas between State and Federal
protection." 12 Unfortunately, this intent
was not effected and the determination of
preemption under Section 301 is still subject to some very diverse interpretations.

Background
The United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall have the power ... To
Promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 13 The constitutional limitation
of copyright to works of "Authors" 14 has
been construed to impose a threshold requirement of an act of authorship - the
work must be original with him. This low
level threshold has no real concern for
aesthetic merit or creative genius, serving
mainly to prevent copyrighting of public
domain material. 15 Copyright is also limited to "Writings," 16 which has been defined to include any physical renderings of
the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic
labor. 17 The primary purpose of copyright
protection is to encourage contributions to
recorded knowledge. Reward in the form
of property rights to the author is a secondary consideration; the limited monopoly
created being justified by the public interest in the creation and dissemination of intellectual works. IS As the Supreme Court
recently reiterated in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,19 this
limited grant achieves an important public
purpose. "It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors
by the provision of a special reward, and to
allow the public access to the products of
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired." 20 The ideaexpression dichotomy balances these two
competing interests by limiting copyright
protection to the author's expression, not
the underlying ideas or facts he expresses. 21
This limit on an author's control is arguably necessary. Were an author able to prevent subsequent authors from using con-

cepts, ideas, or facts contained in his or her
work, the creative process would wither
and scholars would be forced into unproductive replication of the research of their
predecessors. 22 First amendment principles are also brought into play, as a broad
dissemination of principles, ideas, and factual information is crucial to the robust
public debate and informed citizenry that
are "the essence of self-government." 23
The above-stated principles are part of
the underlying problem of preemption. To
allow state protection of ideas and other
subject matter specifically excluded from
federal statutory protection may contravene
the purpose of the copyright clause and violate the constitutional allocation of powers
between federal and state authority.24 Ifit
is determined that Congress, in balancing
the competing interests in copyrighting, rejected the protection ofideas and other excluded subject matter under Section 102(b)
as repugnant to the policy of the copyright
clause, then preemption would be mandated under the supremacy clause,25 regardless of whether or not it is compelled
under Section 301. If, however, the object
of copyrighting is "simply to separate interests the law will protect from those it will
not, and define the levels and conditions of
protection accorded," there would be no justification for the federal system to intrude
into state common law property systems
and preempt rules that serve to protect an
author's investment in creative activity.26
Professor Goldstein suggests that the only
possible justification for striking down
state property systems is that, under the
supremacy clause, they impermissibly interfere with the objects of the federal copyright system.27 He finds little support for
such a proposition, for while the Supreme
Court had adopted a presumption ofinterference in the Sears-Compeo doctrine, they
have since retreated from that position. 28
Advocates of hardline federal preemption
argue that the subject matter of Section
102(b) was meant to belong in the public
domain, and to allow state law to prohibit
the copying of public domain material
would contravene the federal copyright
scheme. 29 Goldstein believes that this approach confuses the patent and copyright
schemes. While patent has high threshold
requirements for protection, copyright requires a minimal showing of originality,
no more rigorous than the standards employed by state doctrines. "There is nothing in the history of ... state laws to suggest that state courts or legislatures are any
more disposed than the federal courts or
Congress to extend monopolies into areas
where they do not belong." 30

Preemption Before the 1976 Act
The Supreme Court considered the question of federal preemption of copyright for
the first time in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stlffel Co., 31 and its companion case Compeo
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 32 In each,
the Court reversed a decision under state
unfair competition law that prohibited the
copying of an unpatentable light fixture.
In Compeo, Justice Black articulated a
sweeping standard of federal preemption.
When an article is unprotected by a
patent or a copyright, state law may
not forbid others to copy that article.
To forbid copying would interfere
with the federal policy, found in Art.
I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution and in
the implementing federal statutes, of
allowing free access to copy whatever
the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain. 33
Copyrights and patents were envisaged as
the only two constitutionally authorized
exceptions to a pervasive federal scheme of
free competition and imitation. 34 State
courts, dissatisfied with the results in SearsCompeo, resorted to artificial distinctions
between "copying" and "misappropriation" to evade federal preemption. 35
Goldstein v. Cahfornia 36 and Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 37 curbed the SearsCompeo preemptive sweep. In Goldstein,
ChiefJ ustice Burger upheld the validity of
a state criminal law, even though the law
extended protection equivalent to copyright to subject matter that had not yet received federal copyright protection. The
standard used to determine whether the
federal statute required preemption was
found in Hines v. Davidowitz: whether the
challenged state law "stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 38 The Court held that the Constitution's grant of copyright power was not
exclusive and that states were free to protect published "writings" that did not fall
within the scope of federal copyright law. 39
The scope of the federal law was to be measured by the coverage of the statute rather
than the purpose of the constitutional
clause. The Court recognized, however,
that "a conflict would develop if a state attempted to protect that which Congress intended to be free from restraint or to free
that which Congress had protected."40
Goldstein has been criticized because it
justifies state law protection regardless of
the subject matter and ignores the copyright clause limitation on monopoly to
"limited times." 41 Professor Goldstein applauds both Goldstein and Kewanee for restoring federal laws to their historically

limited ambit and renewing the vigor of
state doctrines. 42
Kewanee allowed trade secret protection
for processes that were disqualified from
federal patent protection under one of the
patent law's novelty requirements. 43 The
Court expanded the potential scope ofstate
intellectual property legislation even further than had been done in Goldstein when
it concluded that the "only limitation on
the states is that in regulating the area of
patents and copyrights, they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this
area passed by Congress." 44 Thus it would
seem that even if the Goldstein inquiry
showed that a subject matter has not been
left unattended by Congress, a further inquiry must be made. Kewanee compared
the respective economic objectives and effects of the state and federal law, and the
fundamental preemption issue thereby became "not whether state law reaches matters also subject to federal regulation, but
whether the two laws function harmoniously rather than discordantly."45

The Effect of Section 301
In the wake of the liberal authorization
of state intellectual property protection afforded by Goldstein and Kewanee, Section
301 of the 1976 Copyright Act was enacted. 46 The section is intended "to make
clear, consistent with the 1964 Supreme
Court decisions in Sears . . . and Compco
. . . that preemption does not extend to
causes of action, or subject matter outside
the scope of the revised Federal Copyright
Statute."47 Legislative history on the preemptive purpose behind Section 301 is less
than satisfactory due in part to a last minute deletion of a list of state doctrines
deemed non-equivalent to copyright, and
therefore not subject to preemption. 48 The
deletion was apparently intended to conform the section to the Justice Department's
opinion that continued viability ofthe misappropriation doctrine would nullifY the
preemptive effect of the section. However,
this purpose was lost in the ensuing discussion. The Congressman that proposed the
deletion agreed that he was not trying to
change the laws of the states that had already adopted the misappropriation doctrine, stating "I am trying to have this bill
leave the state law alone."49
The muddled legislative history regarding the intended preemptive scope of Section 301 places even more emphasis on
dealing with the section as enacted. Section 301 creates a two-pronged test to determine preemption: (1) Does the subject
matter under consideration come within
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the subject matter of copyright as specified
by Sections 102 and 103? (2) Is the state
right involved equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under Section 106?
Both of these questions must be answered
in the affirmative for a state law to be preempted. If either question is answered in
the negative, Section 301 offers no impediment to the exercise of state power.

(1) The Subject Matter of
Copyright
Under Section 301(a), state-created
rights, even if "within the general scope of
copyright," are not subject to preemption
unless they vest in "works of authorship
that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by Sections
102 and 103." 50 Nimmer suggests that
this is a codification of Goldstein which indicates that "categories of writings which
Congress has ... brought within the scope
of the federal statute" are no longer eligible
for protection. 51
The subject matter of copyright is never
explicitly defined. Section 102(a) sets out
the general area of copyright subject matter. It states that copyright protection subsists "in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression," and
lists seven categories for "works of authorship." Section 102(b) provides that "copyright protection for an original work of
authorship does not extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is
embodied." Since copyright protection is
not available for these matters, they are
arguably not within the subject matter of
copyright, and state law protection of them
would not be preempted. Whereas Goldstein would require an inquiry to determine whether Congress had left the area
unattended or had expressly decided to
deny protection, thereby preempting state
protection, Section 301 provides no basis
for such an inquiry. "Even if Congress considered protecting certain subject matter
and consciously and explicitly determined
that such subject matter should best be left
unprotected, the language of Section 301
by itself would not require preemption." 52
Therefore, the crucial issue is whether the
items listed in Section 102(b) fall within
the subject matter of copyright.
Abrams and Nimmer both subscribe to
the view that the items listed in Section
102(b) are "works ofauthorship" as used to
describe the subject matter of copyright.
Section 102(b), as the codification of the
idea-expression dichotomy, serves as a limitation on the protection extended by the
8- The Law Forum/Spring, 1986

statutory monopoly ofcopyright to subject
matter included under Section 102(a), not
a definition of excluded subject matter. 53
Professor Goldstein is of the opinion that
Section 102(b) specifies certain elements
contained in original works of authorship
which are not protected. 54 Since these elements are excluded from "works of authorship" under Section 102(b), they do not
fall within the subject matter of copyright.
This theory has support in Bromhall v.
Rorvik, 55 which upheld the plaintiff's state
law claim for misappropriation of the ideas
contained in his unpublished doctoral thesis. The court held that since copyright

Concurrent
state-federal
protection is in the
best interests of the
public . ..

protects only the expression of ideas, and
not the ideas themselves, the claims being
considered were not entitled to protection
under the Act and hence were not preempted. 56 The same analysis was used in
Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management
Systems. 57 Rand McNally argued, among
other things, that the defendant had copied
the plaintiff's procedures, processes, and
systems for calculating mileage data in preparing roadway mileage charts. The court
stated that, "[a]s these procedures are expressly excluded from copyright protection, Section 102(b), they fail the subject
matter test of Section 301(a) and are not
preempted." 58 Werlin v. Readers Digest
Association, Inc., 59 goes even further than
the above cases by preventing preemption
of state law protection of ideas whether or
not the ideas are embodied in a copyrightable work. Werlin held that the state quasicontract claim was not preempted and that
plaintiff was entitled to compensation for
the idea of her article. "Werlin's submission to RDA was both an article and an
idea. To the extent it was an article, it enjoyed federal copyright protection; to the
extent it was an idea, it enjoyed no federal
copyright protection but limited state law
protection." 60
However, other courts have consistently
treated facts, research and the like as. being

unprotectable, either by copyright or common law. "Where, as here, historical facts,
themes, and research have been deliberately
exempted from the scope of copyright protection to vindicate the overriding goal of
encouraging contributions to recorded
knowledge, the states are preempted from
removing such materials from the public
domain."61 The same analysis could be
used to preempt idea protection, as all the
items listed in Section 102(b) are arguably
designated for the public domain.

(2) Equivalent Rights
The second prong of the test to determine preemption is whether the state right
involved is equivalent to any of the exclusive rights provided under Section 106. 62
If the state right is infringed by an act that
constitutes copyright infringement, such
as unauthorized reproduction, performance, distribution, or display, then the
right should be deemed equivalent and
subject to preemption if within the subject
matter of copyright. Even if ideas are considered within the subject matter of copyright, they could be protected by nonequivalent state rights. The main problem
here is defining the term "equivalent."
Two different approaches have developed. The first is a comparison of the elements of proof. If an added element must
be established to prove a violation of the
state right, then the right is not preempted.
The second approach examines the impact
and effect of the right and remedy. The
right must be qualitatively different from
that granted by copyright to escape preemption. If the effect of the state right
would be to place the defendant under the
same restrictions from copying and use as
would the copyright laws, then that right
should be preempted.
The doctrine of misappropriation is the
most problematic source of litigation in
this area. While one House Committee
report stated that misappropriation was
"nothing more than copyright protection
under another name," 63 a later Committee
report reached the opposite conclusion:
"Misappropriation is not necessarily synonymous with copyright infringement, and
thus a cause of action labeled as misappropriation is not preempted if it is in fact
based neither on a right within the general
scope of copyright as specified by Section
106 nor on a right equivalent thereto ..."64
The doctrine of misappropriation is invoked when a person imitates or uses a
work developed at the expense of another,
thereby converting the other's investment.
The doctrine has been used to guard against
unauthorized use of public domain materials. First established in International News

Service v. Associated Press,65 the Court allowed state law protection of "hot news"
through a claim of unfair competition, even
though the news was not copyrightable.
The scope of the state law protection authorized was limited, only lasting long
enough for I.N.S. to retain the financial incentive to be the first to gather and disseminate the news. The Court carefully balanced the copyright and first amendment
issues, and the case stands as an example of
the benefits of allowing state protection of
matter excluded from copyright protection under Section 102(b).
Misappropriation is generally agreed to
have these elements: (I) creation of plaintiff's product through extensive time, labor, skill, and money; (2) defendant's use
of that product in competition with the
plaintiff, thereby gaining special advantage
since the defendant is not burdened with
the developmental expenses incurred by
the plaintiff; and (3) commercial damage
to the plaintiff. To the extent that the misappropriation doctrine merely prevents
reproduction and distribution, the rights
being protected appear to be equivalent to
those protected by Section 106. 66 However,
when direct competition exists, misappropriation seemingly only protects "the limited right of a commercial enterprise to be
free from unfair competitive practices that
deprive it of a fair return on its work and
investment." 67
The grant of limited rights against the
unfair acts of a competitor, not against the
public at large, would not appear to conflict with federal policy. According to the
House Report, however, misappropriation
seems to be preserved only to the extent it
protects against a pattern of unfair use by a
competitor. 68 They reason that the element
of competition is almost always present in
infringement situations, and really adds
nothing further to the rights contained in
Section 106, whereas a pattern ofunfair use
by a competitor would be non-equivalent.
Judicial interpretations vary. The Court
in Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting
Companies 69 stated that the New York unfair competition law was preempted to the
extent that the claim relied on the misappropriation branch of the law, citing Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy COrp.,70 but
to the extent that the claim relied on "passing off," it was not asserting rights equivalent to those protected by copyright and
therefore would not be preempted. "Passing off" generally requires a showing of
consumer deception and appropriation of
good will. As long as a strong showing
of deception is made, the element of"passing off" actually does protect a right different in kind from the Section 106 rights.
However, if the claim was based mainly on

a good will dilution theory, it arguably
should not survive preemption. 71 Roy Ex-

port Co. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 72
upheld a state unfair competition claim on
the basis of the extra element of commercial immorality. "The fact that the basis
for the finding of unfair competition may
have partly overlapped the basis for the
finding of statutory copyright infringement is insufficient to find the unfair competition claim preempted where, as here,
the law of unfair competition serves to
compliment, rather than conflict with,
federal law." 73

Conclusion
Nothing definitive about the present
status of state idea protection can be said in
light of the discrepant results reached in
the application of Section 301. However, a
proper analysis of the preemption problem
cannot be reached using Section 30 I principles alone. It is hard, ifnot impossible, to
evaluate the proper scope of preemption
under Section 30 I without determining
the purposes and policy behind the copyright clause and the current Copyright Act.
The two inquiries suggested in Goldstein
should be required to determine if the subject matter is covered by the Copyright Act,
and if not, whether it had been left unattended or deliberately excluded from protection by Congress. Limitations on state
law protection should also be defined to
keep the states extending monopolies beyond the public's interest, as well as some
durational limitations. 74 However, upon
review, state protection of ideas and the excluded subject matter of Section 102(b)
under the current Act has never been offensive to the policy of promoting progress and
expanding the contributions to recorded
knowledge; rather, state protection operates to relieve injustices that would be permitted if such protection were preempted.
Concurrent state-federal protection is in
the best interests of the public, and should
not be dismissed without a thorough analysis of the policies of the copyright clause
and the effects of denying such protection
in a capitalistic, reward-motivated society.
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149 (D.D.C. 1980); See also, Hoehling v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2nd Cir.), cert.
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